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An Ethical Gap in Agency Adjudication
LOUIS J. VIRELLI III†
ABSTRACT
There is an ongoing crisis of confidence in American
government. Accusations of incompetence and political selfdealing dominate news cycles as public institutions seek to
combat—with varying degrees of success—the public health
and economic consequences of a global pandemic.
Highlighted in this struggle is the larger issue of the
importance of integrity to the efficacy and legitimacy of
administrative government. This is especially true for agency
adjudication, as it is the form of agency action that most
directly impacts individuals. Recusal—the process by which
an adjudicator is removed, voluntarily or involuntarily, from
a specific proceeding—is a time-honored way of protecting the
†Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. This Article originated as
a report to the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS or “the
Conference). LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, RECUSAL RULES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
ADJUDICATORS (2018), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Recusa
l%20Rules%20for%20Administrative%20Adjudicators%20-%20Final%20Report
%2011.30.2018.pdf. I am grateful to the staff at ACUS, in particular the members
of ACUS’s Committee on Adjudication, for their helpful feedback on that report.
This Article further develops the ideas and conclusions in that report and offers
some additional normative assessments. As with the initial report, the opinions,
views, and recommendations expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the members of the Conference or its committees,
except where formal recommendations of the Conference are cited.
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integrity of all manner of quasi-judicial activity, including
agency adjudication. Yet the existing landscape of agency
recusal standards exhibits gaps in coverage that potentially
threaten the efficacy of, and public confidence in, that
adjudication. This Article, which is based on a report for the
Administrative Conference of the United States, is the first to
identify the full range of recusal standards that impact
agency adjudicators and to evaluate their effectiveness in
light of recusal’s dual purposes of promoting fairness to
litigants and public confidence in the integrity of the
proceedings. It concludes that the best way to fill the ethical
gap in agency adjudication is through agency-specific recusal
regulations that seek to preserve both the reliability and
effectiveness of agency adjudication.
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INTRODUCTION
The
administrative
state,
and
administrative
adjudication in particular, are under siege. Public confidence
in government institutions is at historic lows, and evidence
from popular political discourse suggests that public
institutions—and administrative agencies specifically—are
viewed skeptically by both sides of the political aisle. 1
For proponents of active, independent agency
adjudication, agencies are becoming too beholden to the
White House or otherwise constrained in their substantive
authority. 2 During the last year of the Trump
Administration, the White House Office of Management and
Budget published a request for information related to ideas
for “[p]rotecting Americans against the unjust or arbitrary
exercise of government power” through agency adjudication; 3
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) began strongly
advocating for the courts to require “at will” removal of
agency adjudicators, thereby limiting those adjudicators’
independence from political, that is presidential, influence. 4
The Supreme Court accepted DOJ’s invitation, holding the
structure of two independent agencies unconstitutional
1. AMY E. LERMAN, GOOD ENOUGH FOR GOVERNMENT WORK: THE PUBLIC
REPUTATION CRISIS IN AMERICA (AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO FIX IT) 4 (2019) (“[T]he
tendency of Americans to associate ‘public’ with ineffective, inefficient, and lowquality services . . . is a central feature of our modern political culture.”).
2. See Peter Shane, Trump’s Quiet Power Grab, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 26,
2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/trumps-quiet-powergrab/607087 (“The Trump administration has launched an obscure but dangerous
effort to undermine this system, and to dictate both the appropriate
circumstances for commencing adjudication and the rules that govern how
disputes with agencies are resolved.”).
3. Improving and Reforming Regulatory Enforcement and Adjudication, 85
Fed. Reg. 5483, 5483 (Jan. 30, 2020).
4. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2195
(2020); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2050 n.1 (2018) (neglecting to decide the
issue, put forth by the government for the first time on appeal to the Supreme
Court, whether removal protections for administrative law judges
unconstitutionally infringe on the President’s removal power under Article II of
the Constitution).
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because they were headed by single directors who were
protected from removal by the president, 5 and another
because agency adjudicators’ decisions were not
automatically reviewable by a politically accountable actor. 6
For advocates of smaller or less active government,
agencies are bureaucratic behemoths, out to preserve their
own longevity and significance as much as pursue the public
good. 7 A 2017 report by the Pew Research Center found that
“the overall level of trust in government remains near
historic lows; just 20% say they trust the government to do
what’s right always or most of the time,” and a similar survey
in 2021 revealed that “[o]nly about one-quarter of Americans
today say they can trust the government in Washington to do
what is right ‘just about always’ (2%) or ‘most of the time’
(22%).” 8 The recent controversy over whether the Chair of
5. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192 (holding that statutory for cause removal
protection for the Director of the independent Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau is incompatible with Article II’s grant of removal authority to the
President); Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1783–84 (2021) (relying on Seila
Law in holding that the structure of the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which
includes a single director removable only for cause, was unconstitutional because
it “lacks a foundation in historical practice and clashes with constitutional
structure by concentrating power in a unilateral actor insulated from
Presidential control”).
6. See United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1987–88 (2021)
(holding the appointment of administrative patent judges (APJs)
unconstitutional because they are principal officers appointed by the Secretary
of Commerce, and remedying the constitutional infirmity by invalidating the
statutory provision prohibiting review of APJ decisions by the director of the
Patent and Trademark Appeals Board, who is appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate).
7. See PHILIP WALLACH, BROOKINGS INST., THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S
LEGITIMACY CRISIS 1 (Elizabeth Sablich ed., 2016), https://www.brookings.edu
/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Administrative-state-legitimacy-crisis_FINAL.pdf
(“People begin to doubt not only the recent performance of their governments, but
their basic legitimacy: their claim to be uniquely representative institutions
working on the public’s behalf.”); id. at 5 (“[A] kind of institutionalized antiinstitutionalism now looms larger in American politics than at any time in living
memory . . . . The administrative state—generically referred to as ‘the
bureaucracy’ . . . often takes on a focal role in discussions of the American
government’s legitimacy.”).
8. PEW RSCH. CTR., PUBLIC TRUST IN GOVERNMENT REMAINS NEAR HISTORIC
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the Federal Trade Commission, Lina Khan, should recuse
herself from antitrust cases involving Amazon and Facebook
reflects this cynicism about the motives and impartiality of
administrators. 9
Despite any controversy over their contributions, the
work of administrative agencies remains prevalent and
critically important to achieving the Nation’s policy goals.
This is most apparent during national crises—like the
attacks of 9/11 and the COVID-19 pandemic—but is also true
in more ordinary times, as issues like food and workplace
safety, unemployment insurance, and healthcare coverage
have become part and parcel of our political culture. In such
an environment—where skepticism abounds yet our reliance
on agencies persists—the integrity of agency action is
essential to the efficacy and legitimacy of administrative
government. Agency credibility alleviates skepticism about
the process while producing results that encourage
acceptance and compliance.
Administrative adjudication is a powerful and wideranging tool for implementing agencies’ statutory missions.
Adjudication’s more specific, individualized determinations
implicate litigants’ rights to fair and impartial treatment
more directly than other agency conduct, like rulemaking.
From enforcement proceedings to benefits determinations
and grant awards, agency adjudicators make myriad
decisions that have profound and personal impacts on our
LOWS AS PARTISAN ATTITUDES SHIFT 1 (2017), https://www.pewresearch.org
/politics/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/05/05-03-17-Trust-release.pdf; Public
Trust in Government: 1958-2021, PEW RSCH. CTR. (May 17, 2021), https://www.
pewresearch.org/politics/2021/05/17/public-trust-in-government-1958-2021.
9. See, e.g., Letter from Four Members of Congress to Mark Zuckerberg,
Chief Exec. Officer, Facebook, Inc., and Andy Jassy, Chief Exec. Officer, Amazon
Services, Inc. (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/Letter%20to%20Amazon%20and%20Facebook%20re%20Petitions%20for%20K
han%20Recusal%20(8.4.21).pdf; Marcy Gordon, Facebook Asks Recusal of FTC
Head in Antitrust Case Decision, AP NEWS (July 14, 2021), https://apnews
.com/article/technology-joe-biden-business-government-and-politics-be2dc68dac
93003a6df23aaec1614d06 (reporting on Facebook and Amazon’s attempts to have
Chair Khan recused from ongoing antitrust cases against the companies).
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daily lives. Yet those same adjudicators are neither
politically accountable for their choices, 10 nor effectively
insulated from the political branches like Article III courts. 11
As a result, basic notions of administrative legitimacy 12 and
due process make the independence and integrity of agency
adjudicators critically important to both the effectiveness of,
and public confidence in, administrative government. Among
the forces that influence the independence and integrity of
agency adjudicators, 13 recusal—the process by which an
adjudicator is removed, voluntarily or involuntarily, from a
specific proceeding—has the strongest historical pedigree. 14
10. Removal provisions governing adjudicators may make adjudicators more
or less accountable to the President or another executive branch official who is in
turn accountable to the President. But because adjudicators are not directly
elected, they are not directly accountable to the electorate in the same way as
members of Congress and the President. Many of them, especially ALJs, also
enjoy statutory or regulatory salary and tenure protections that further insulate
them from influence by the political branches. See 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (setting ALJ
salary protections for ALJs); 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (setting ALJ removal protections).
But see KENT BARNETT, MALIA REDDICK, LOGAN CORNETT & RUSSELL WHEELER,
NON-ALJ ADJUDICATORS IN FEDERAL AGENCIES: STATUS, SELECTION, OVERSIGHT,
AND REMOVAL 39-59 (2017) (“Barnett et al. Study”) (noting that non-ALJ
adjudicators often do not enjoy the same statutory protections as ALJs, and
describing some of the protections that do exist for non-ALJs, including
separation of functions requirements and prohibitions on ex parte
communications).
11. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times,
receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.”).
12. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness
and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 462 (2003)
(“From the birth of the administrative state, we have struggled to describe our
regulatory government as the legitimate child of a constitutional democracy.”).
13. Appointment and removal, congressional oversight, and limits on ex parte
contacts all help constrain adjudicators and preserve the integrity of the
adjudicative process. Although prohibitions on ex parte contacts may sometimes
rely on recusal as a remedy, the two are conceptually distinct. See discussion infra
Part II.
14. Historically, the process by which judges removed themselves from a case
was called recusal, and the process by which they were forced to withdraw was
called disqualification. In modern practice, the two terms are used
interchangeably. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
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In the judicial context, recusal is as old as courts
themselves; judges have either removed themselves or been
forced to withdraw from cases for a variety of (mostly ethical)
reasons. Recusal fulfills two primary purposes. First, it
protects individual litigants against biased or conflicted
adjudicators to ensure the fair and objective resolution of
their claims. Second, it protects the integrity of the
adjudicatory system by promoting public confidence in the
impartiality and fairness of the adjudicative process. In
modern American jurisprudence, federal judicial recusal is
governed by at least two sources of law: the Due Process
Clause and wider-reaching recusal statutes. 15
Recusal has a role in administrative adjudication that is
at least analogous to its role in judicial proceedings.
Administrative adjudicators remove themselves—either
voluntarily or pursuant to some mandatory legal standard—
from proceedings over which they would otherwise preside in
order to protect both the rights of the parties to an impartial
hearing and the public’s confidence in the adjudicative
system.
Unlike
with
judicial
recusal,
however,
administrative adjudicators do not have the benefit of a
generally applicable recusal statute to help guide their
decisions. 16 Agency recusal is currently governed by
government ethics rules, various statutory provisions, and
the Due Process Clause. Taken together, this amorphous
collection of recusal standards leaves potentially important
features of agency integrity unprotected.
The current reality of administrative recusal thus begs
several questions. First, would more targeted, agencyspecific recusal rules bring more clarity, consistency, and
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 4 (Banks & Jordan 2d ed. 2007) (“In fact, in
modern practice ‘disqualification’ and ‘recusal’ are frequently viewed as
synonymous, and employed interchangeably.”). For consistency’s sake, recusal
will be used here to refer to both situations—voluntary and involuntary
withdrawal of an agency adjudicator.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. V; 28 U.S.C. § 455 (federal judicial recusal statute).
16. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 455 (federal judicial recusal statute).
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integrity to administrative adjudication? If so, to what
sources of law should agencies look before fashioning such
rules, and how should those rules be promulgated? Finally,
what procedures should agencies employ to enforce recusal
rules, and should those rules treat different adjudicators
within an agency—hearing officers versus appellate
adjudicators, for instance—differently? This Article seeks to
address these questions by building on two recent
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS)
studies of administrative adjudication to examine the
various laws and standards affecting recusal for a defined
subset of agency adjudicators and to evaluate whether more
tailored recusal regulations would further the goals of
impartiality and public confidence that are necessary to good
government.
This Article concludes that the best way to fill the
existing gaps in recusal standards for administrative
adjudication is for agencies to promulgate regulations
governing recusal for their own adjudicators. Agencies
should consider the specific nature and demands of their own
adjudicative system to design a set of recusal standards that
will protect parties against actual bias as well as project the
appearance of impartiality to a watchful public. In addition
to recusal standards, agencies’ regulations should also
include procedures for resolving recusal questions, including
a way for parties to bring recusal issues to the presiding
adjudicator and a process to appeal the initial recusal
decision both inside and outside the agency. In sum, agencies
must consider the nature of their proceedings and of their
adjudicators, as well as institutional needs and limitations
in order to promulgate regulations that best balance
adjudicative integrity with the agency’s need for timely and
effective adjudications.
Part I outlines the scope of the current project. Part II
describes the legal provisions impacting (however indirectly)
administrative recusal. Part III analyzes the benefits of
agency-specific recusal standards in light of the importance
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of administrative legitimacy in adjudication and the twin
goals of recusal. Part IV considers how procedural regimes
fit into the larger recusal picture, and Part V concludes with
some thoughts on best practices for administrative recusal.
I.

SCOPE OF THE PROJECT

The term adjudication covers a vast array of agency
conduct. The difficulty in accurately defining and organizing
all of the agency conduct that fits under the umbrella of
agency adjudication requires some line drawing. In general,
one distinct category of adjudication—referred to by
Professor Michael Asimow as “Type A” adjudication—
consists of evidentiary hearings prescribed by certain
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and
presided over by administrative law judges (ALJs). 17 A
second category is comprised of evidentiary hearings that are
required by law but are not governed by the same APA
sections and do not involve ALJs (in general, “Type B”
adjudication). 18 Finally, the largest (and most widely varied)
category of agency adjudication is that which does not

17. Type A adjudication is defined in Professor Asimow’s recent ACUS study
as “adjudicatory systems governed by the adjudicatory sections [554, 556, and
557] of the APA . . . [and] presided over by administrative law judges (ALJs).”
MICHAEL ASIMOW, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS OUTSIDE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 2 (2016) (“Asimow Study”).
18. Although referring to this category of adjudication as Type B adjudication
is useful and adequate for present purposes, it is not completely accurate. The
Asimow Study defined Type B adjudication as “evidentiary hearings required by
statute, regulation, or executive orders, that are not governed by the adjudication
provisions [§§ 554, 556, 557] of the APA” and that are decided exclusively on the
record developed during the proceeding (the “exclusive-record limitation”). Id. at
2, 20. A more recent ACUS study focused only on Type B proceedings that
required oral, as opposed to purely written, evidentiary hearings, but did not
require that those proceedings include the “exclusive-record limitation” used in
the Asimow Study. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 13. Because this project
considers a wider range of evidentiary hearings by agency adjudicators, the
relatively slight distinctions between the types of hearings examined in the
Asimow and Barnett et al. Studies are not directly relevant to the present
discussion.
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require—yet may permit—an evidentiary hearing. 19
Two recent ACUS studies have focused on the second
category of adjudication described above: legally required
evidentiary hearings that are not presided over by ALJs.
Both studies built on a collection of previous ACUS studies
that examined various aspects of non-ALJ agency
adjudication. 20 In connection with the Evidentiary Hearings
Outside the Administrative Procedure Act project,
Administrative Conference attorneys, working with
Professor Asimow (the project consultant), created a
database containing “information about all of the schemes of
Type A and Type B federal agency adjudication” (“Asimow
Study”). 21 Professor Asimow then relied on this information
and conducted additional research to “formulate . . . best
practices for Type B adjudication.” 22 Drawing on the Asimow
Study, the ACUS Assembly adopted Recommendation 20164, which recommended that agencies promulgate regulations
addressing three distinct categories of adjudicator bias: bias
resulting from “a. Improper financial or other personal
interest in the decision; b. Personal animus against [a party
19. This category is described in the Asimow Study as “Type C” adjudication.
ASIMOW, supra note 17, at 2.
20. The first study of non-ALJ adjudication was a 1989 ACUS-sponsored
survey by John Frye, who had served as both an ALJ and a non-ALJ (“ Frye
Study”). The Frye Study cataloged the use of non-ALJs in oral evidentiary
hearings, and the results were published in a 1992 law review article. See John
H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing Programs in the Federal Government, 44
ADMIN. L. REV. 261 (1992). Next was a comprehensive 1992 study by Paul
Verkuil, Daniel Gifford, Charles Koch, Richard Pierce, and Jeffrey Lubbers
(“Verkuil et al. Study”). PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
JUDICIARY (1992). The Verkuil et al. Study built on the Frye Study and included
information on the history and variety of administrative adjudications; the
attitudes, selection, and independence of agency adjudicators; the effect of
adjudicators’ decisions; and standards for when agencies should rely on ALJs for
their adjudications. See id. The third study was a survey by Raymond Limon,
who primarily updated the Frye Study’s data on non-ALJs. RAYMOND LIMON, OFF.
OF ADMIN. L. JUDGES, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY THEN AND NOW—
A DECADE OF CHANGE 1992–2002, at 2 (1992).
21. ASIMOW, supra note 17, at 2.
22. Id. at 4.
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or agency attorney]; or c. Prejudgment of the adjudicative
facts at issue in the proceeding.” 23 These three instances of
bias were included as grounds for recusal of Type B
adjudicators. 24
In 2018, Kent Barnett, Malia Reddick, Logan Cornett,
and Russell Wheeler submitted Non-ALJ Adjudicators and
Federal Agencies: Status, Selection, Oversight, and Removal
(the “Barnett et al. Study”). The Barnett et al. Study
addressed issues related to selection, oversight, evaluation,
discipline, and removal of non-ALJ adjudicators. It also
supplemented and updated information from prior ACUS
studies and suggested best practices for Type B
adjudication. 25 Of particular interest to this project is the
study’s treatment of “non-ALJ . . . oversight, and
independence,” which included recusal standards. 26 Like the
Asimow Study, the Barnett et al. Study suggested that
agencies promulgate standards for non-ALJs that clearly
state the grounds for disqualification and that outline
procedures for enforcing and reviewing the application of
those standards. 27 The proposed recommendation associated
with the Barnett et al. Study suggested that agencies
consider pursuing “supplemental regulations pertaining to
the disqualification of administrative judges from particular
hearings that augment [the Office of Government Ethics’s]
standards . . . govern[ing] the disqualification of federal
employees from participating in particular matters due to

23. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings
Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315
(Dec. 23, 2016).
24. See id.
25. See BARNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 11–13. The category of adjudication
considered in the Barnett et al. Study was not precisely the same as what the
Asimow Study defined as Type B adjudication, but the differences between the
two remain immaterial for present purposes. See supra note 18 and
accompanying text.
26. Id. at 2.
27. Id. at 67.
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the appearance of loss of impartiality.” 28
This project approaches the issue of administrative
recusal from the foundation laid by Asimow and Barnett et
al. It takes a broader and more detailed look at the relevant
legal and other sources of administrative recusal standards
and asks whether there is a need within this landscape for
agency-specific recusal regulations. The answer depends on
the category of agency adjudication being examined. In order
to clarify and sharpen its scope, this study focused on the
recusal of Type A and B adjudicators (rather than simply all
government employees). It therefore includes ALJs, which
were part of the adjudication database created by
Administrative Conference attorneys and Professor Asimow
in connection with Evidentiary Hearings Outside the
Administrative Procedure Act, but were not included in
either the Asimow Study or the Barnett et al. Study.
The current study also includes Type B adjudicators but
defines the relevant universe of these non-ALJ adjudicators
differently than previous studies. The Type B adjudicators
included here are those who preside over evidentiary
hearings required by statute, regulation, or executive order,
and who decide appeals of decisions arising from those
hearings. This definition is broader than that used in the
Barnett et al. Study in that it—like the Asimow Study—
includes non-ALJ adjudicators who preside over legally
required written and oral (as opposed to just oral) hearings.
It is also technically broader than the Asimow Study’s
definition, because it is not limited to hearings decided
exclusively on the record developed during the proceeding,
although that may in fact be, at least with regard to required
written hearings, a distinction without a difference. 29 In
28. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Administrative Judges Committee on
Adjudication Proposed Recommendation 6–7 (June 14, 2018), https://www.acus
.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Proposed%20Recommendation%20for%20Plen
ary_0.pdf.
29. As the Barnett et al. Study revealed, “we are not aware of any [oral]
hearings that the agencies identified that lack an exclusive-record
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sum, the scope of adjudicators considered in this study is
broader than the Barnett et al. Study and at least as broad
as the Asimow Study. It is also—and perhaps most
importantly so—simpler and easier to describe when
identifying information about agencies’ recusal standards
and practices. This combination of breadth and simplicity is
designed to maximize the range and depth of information
obtained about recusal in agency adjudications.
Due to the wide range of adjudicators targeted by this
study, this Article examines a similarly broad scope of
recusal-related sources to identify any gaps in existing
standards and practices that may indicate a need for agencyspecific recusal regulations. It is important to note that
references to the substantive limitations of certain legal or
ethical frameworks with regard to recusal are not intended
as criticisms of those provisions. The purpose of the following
Part is to explore the existing landscape of legal and other
sources that could potentially affect administrative recusal.
Many of those provisions are not targeted at agencies or
adjudication, and, as such, should not be expected to provide
comprehensive recusal standards. It is nevertheless
necessary to examine the full range of potentially relevant
sources in order to evaluate the potential utility of agencyspecific recusal rules.
As seen in the following Part, there does appear to be a
range of adjudicator conduct that could merit recusal yet is
not currently regulated—a potential “ethical gap” in agency
adjudication.

limitation . . . .” BARNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 14.
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II. THE “LAW” OF RECUSAL
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATORS
A. Due Process
Due process is the lifeblood of adjudication. Although not
always easy to define, it is the legitimizing principle for
government resolution of disputes between specific parties. 30
In that capacity, due process has two related, but
conceptually distinct, applications. First, due process
ensures that parties will receive adequate notice and an
opportunity to be heard in connection with the resolution of
their claims or defenses. 31 The scope of the required notice
and hearing depends at least in part on the parties’ level of
personal interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 32
Proceedings with more formalized, rigorous procedures can
be understood to recognize a greater personal interest in the
outcome of those proceedings.
A litigant’s opportunity to be heard depends, in turn, on
both the literal availability of a forum to hear their claims
and the ability of that forum to resolve them fairly. The
fairness of the resolution is premised on the notion that all
parties to an adjudication are entitled to a neutral, unbiased
arbiter. 33 This includes a range of requirements relating to
an adjudicator’s impartiality, from “an absence of actual
bias” 34 against the parties to the admonitions that “no man
30. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Due
process has not been reduced to any formula; its content cannot be determined
by reference to any code. The best that can be said is that through the course of
this Court’s decisions it has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon
postulates of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that
liberty and the demands of organized society.”).
31. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
32. Id. at 334–35.
33. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (“It is
axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process.’” (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955))).
34. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8 (2016) (quoting Murchison, 349
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can be a judge in his own case” 35 and that the “possible
temptation to the average man as a judge . . . not to hold the
balance nice, clear, and true between the [parties]” denies
them due process of law. 36
Just
like
judicial
proceedings,
administrative
adjudication must satisfy all of these criteria to pass
constitutional muster. 37 Recusal can be a powerful tool to
remedy due process violations, especially in cases where the
adjudicator exhibits actual or probable bias against a party
or has a personal conflict of interest. The Supreme Court has
confirmed recusal’s role in these cases but has been reluctant
to apply due process protections too broadly, repeatedly
invoking the idea that most recusal issues will be the product
of legislative discretion. 38
In one of its earliest cases directly addressing recusal
under the Due Process Clause, the Court in Tumey v. Ohio
explained that “in determining what due process of law is,
under the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment, the Court must
look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing
in the common and statute law of England before the
emigration of our ancestors.” 39 The common law standard at
the Founding only mandated recusal in cases of pecuniary
interest, and that approach is reflected in the Court’s earliest
U.S. at 136).
35. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136; see also Caperton, 556 U.S. at 886 (“[N]o man
is allowed to be a judge in his own cause . . . .”).
36. Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532
(1927)).
37. See Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385–86 (1908). Due
process of course applies to all forms of adjudication, including adjudicative
decisions that do not involve evidentiary hearings.
38. See Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (noting that “most matters relating to
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level” (quoting FTC v.
Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948))); see also Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523 (“All
questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus,
matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest, would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion.”).
39. 273 U.S. at 523.
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approach to due process recusal. 40 In Tumey v. Ohio, the
Court found a due process violation where a mayor tried and
convicted a defendant despite the fact that a portion of the
defendant’s fine remitted to the mayor personally. 41 Some
fifty years later, the Court expanded the pecuniary interest
prohibition in Ward v. Village of Monroeville to include an
adjudicator’s indirect financial interest. 42 Like Tumey, Ward
involved a mayor-as-adjudicator in Ohio. But rather than the
mayor receiving a portion of the fine for himself, as in Tumey,
the fine issued by the mayor in Ward only benefitted the
municipality. 43 In the Court’s view, a due process violation
“may also exist when the mayor’s executive responsibilities
for village finances may make him partisan to maintain the
high level of contribution from the mayor’s court.” 44
In addition to financial interest, the Court has applied
the Due Process Clause in cases where the adjudicator is
facing some other conflict. Roughly thirty years after Tumey,
the Court returned to due process and recusal in In re
Murchison. 45 Under Michigan law, judges could serve as a
“one-man grand jury.” 46 In Murchison, a Michigan judge
serving as a one-person grand jury commanded two
witnesses to testify as part of the grand jury proceeding.
Suspecting each of the witnesses of perjuring themselves, the
judge charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced them both for

40. LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, DISQUALIFYING THE HIGH COURT: SUPREME COURT
RECUSAL AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2016) (“[T]he law of judicial recusal in America
around the time of the Founding looked very much like Blackstone’s version. The
American colonial courts adopted the pecuniary interest standard, which
persisted through the ratification of the Constitution and the creation of the lower
federal courts.”).
41. 273 U.S. at 523.
42. 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972).
43. Id. at 58 (“A major part of village income is derived from the fines,
forfeitures, costs, and fees imposed by him in his mayor’s court.”).
44. Id. at 60.
45. See 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
46. Id. at 133.
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contempt. The witnesses objected on due process grounds,
claiming that the judge who suspected and charged them of
perjury could not also try and convict them of the same
charge. Despite the fact that the judge in Murchison did not
have any pecuniary interest in the outcome, the Court held
that it was indeed a violation of the defendants’ due process
rights to have the same judge charge, try, and convict them. 47
It explained that due process “may sometimes bar trial by
judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very
best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties. But to perform its high function in the best way
‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’” 48
The Court further developed its conflict-of-interest
rationale in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 49 another contempt
case in which a pro se criminal defendant, Mr. Mayberry,
repeatedly “vilified” the presiding judge in open court. 50
When the same judge charged and found Mr. Mayberry
guilty of contempt, Mr. Mayberry objected on due process
grounds. The Court held due process required the judge’s
recusal, mirroring its language in Murchison that “justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice.” 51 Murchison and
Mayberry are important due process cases because they
represent a departure from the traditional focus on a judge’s
pecuniary interest toward a potentially wider range of
disqualifying conduct, including conduct that threatens a
judge’s appearance of impartiality. It is equally important to
note, however, that the conflicts experienced by the judges in
both cases were rather direct and personal; the Court in
Mayberry noted that the defendant’s “[i]nsults [were] apt to
47. Id. at 139.
48. Id. at 136 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
49. 400 U.S. 455, 455–58 (1971).
50. Id. at 456, 458 (noting that the defendant called the judge a “hatchet man
for the State,” “a dirty sonofabitch,” and a “stumbling dog,” told him to “go to
Hell,” and asked him, “What are you working for? The prison authorities, you
bum?”).
51. Id. at 465 (quoting Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14).
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strike ‘at the most vulnerable and human qualities of a
judge’s temperament,’” resulting in the judge becoming so
“personally embroiled” in the confrontation as to give the
appearance of injustice. 52
The Court took a similar approach in a case involving an
alleged financial interest by a state supreme court justice. In
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, 53 the Court considered
whether the members of the Alabama Supreme Court should
be recused from deciding issues of state insurance law that
could impact two suits in which the justices were parties.
One of the suits was an individual suit by Justice Embry. The
other was a class action on behalf of all Alabama state
employees insured under a particular insurance plan, which
happened to include every member of the Alabama Supreme
Court. Aetna moved to recuse Justice Embry on the basis of
his involvement in these related lawsuits, and to recuse the
entire Alabama Supreme Court based on their potential
inclusion in the class action suit. 54
The Supreme Court concluded that Justice Embry’s
participation violated the Due Process Clause, but that the
participation of the remainder of his colleagues on the
Alabama Supreme Court did not. In the process, the U.S.
Supreme Court clarified the scope of its “appearance of
justice” standard from Ward and Murchison when it held
that a “general hostility toward insurance companies” was
not enough of an interest in the case to require Justice
Embry’s recusal, but that because his opinion had the “clear
and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and
the settlement value of his own case,” his interest was
sufficiently “direct, personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary” to

52. Id. at 465–66.
53. 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
54. Id. at 817. Two of the Alabama Supreme Court justices affirmatively
removed themselves from the pending class action suit once they became aware
of it. Id. at 818.
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merit recusal on those grounds. 55 By contrast, the remaining
members of the Alabama Supreme Court in Justice Embry’s
class action suit did not need to recuse on due process
grounds, because their potential interest was not as direct
and personal. 56
The Court’s two most recent recusal cases applying the
Due Process Clause clarify the boundaries of the
constitutional doctrine. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 57
involved an appeal from a $50 million West Virginia jury
verdict against Massey. Soon after, Massey’s President and
CEO Don Blankenship contributed $3 million—more than all
other contributions combined—to Brent Benjamin’s
campaign for state supreme court justice in West Virginia.
Mr. Benjamin narrowly won the election but was asked to
recuse himself from Massey’s appeal of its case against
Caperton to the state supreme court. Justice Benjamin
denied the motion to recuse, and the court reversed the jury
verdict against Massey by a vote of 3–2. It denied Caperton’s
request for rehearing by the same margin. Justice Benjamin
was in the majority for both decisions. 58
The U.S. Supreme Court held that Justice Benjamin’s
failure to recuse himself violated the Due Process Clause.
Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy restated the Court’s
consistent refrain that most recusal cases do not rise to the
level of a constitutional issue. 59 He then explained that the
facts of the case were “extreme by any measure” creating
“circumstances ‘in which . . . the probability of actual bias on
the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be
constitutionally tolerable.’” 60

55. Id. at 824.
56. Id. at 824–25.
57. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
58. Id. at 872–74.
59. Id. at 876.
60. Id. at 877, 887 (citations omitted).
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Similarly dramatic facts led the Court to find a
probability of actual bias in its most recent due process
recusal case, Williams v. Pennsylvania. 61 Williams asked
whether a state supreme court justice violated due process
by declining to recuse himself from a case involving the
revocation of a death sentence that the justice himself had
personally approved while serving as the district attorney
responsible for overseeing the prosecution. The U.S.
Supreme Court, applying the “probability of actual bias” test
from Caperton, held that Chief Justice Castille’s involvement
in Williams’s conviction and sentence created a significant
enough risk of actual bias that due process required his
recusal from the case. The Court explained that the Chief
Justice’s involvement created “a risk that the judge ‘would
be so psychologically wedded’ to his or her previous position”
that recusal was necessary. 62
Caperton and Williams represent the current state of the
Court’s recusal jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause.
Notwithstanding the Court’s appeals to the “appearance of
justice,” its holdings and other statements make clear that
this statement is not meant to conflate constitutional recusal
requirements with the broader “impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” standard in the federal recusal
statute. 63 For one, the Court has limited its recusal decisions
only to cases described in Caperton as “extreme by any
measure,” 64 and in Mayberry as instances where judges are
so “personally embroiled” in the case that the likelihood of
bias is intolerably high. 65
Perhaps more importantly, the Court has consistently

61. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016).
62. Id. at 1906.
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).
64. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 887 (“Our decision today addresses an
extraordinary situation where the Constitution requires recusal. . . . The facts
now before us are extreme by any measure.”).
65. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971).
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reaffirmed its position that most recusal cases do not
implicate the Due Process Clause. In discussing a case in
which a Federal Trade Commissioner’s public comments
about a legal issue did not require his recusal from a case
involving that issue, the Court made clear that, citing some
of its oldest recusal precedents, “most matters relating to
judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional
level,” 66 and “‘matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy,
[and] remoteness of interest, would seem generally to be
matters merely of legislative discretion.’” 67 This qualification
is a consistent theme in the Court’s recusal jurisprudence,
and it serves as a demarcation of the boundary between the
narrow range of due process recusals—recusals based on
whether a reasonable judge would likely be biased in a given
case—and the broader universe of situations that could raise
concerns about the impartiality and legitimacy of an
adjudicator’s decision. 68
B. Federal Recusal Statute
The federal judicial recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455,
represents the broadest recusal standard applicable to
federal adjudicators (specifically, federal judges). It
represents the culmination of two centuries of legislative
66. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 876 (quoting FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702
(1948)).
67. Id. (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927)).
68. The lower courts have applied due process principles to administrative
recusal, most notably in Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC,
where the court held that prejudgment of adjudicative facts by an agency head
violated the Due Process Clause. 425 F.2d 583, 589–91 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The court
in Cinderella explained that “[t]he test for disqualification has been succinctly
stated as being whether ‘a disinterested observer may conclude that (the agency)
has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case in
advance of hearing it.’” Id. at 591 (quoting Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d
461, 469 (2d Cir. 1959)). The prejudgment standard applied in Cinderella is
analogous to the impartiality requirement for ALJs under § 556 of the APA and
is often used interchangeably. In any event, it, like the Supreme Court’s
probability of actual bias test, represents a narrower view of recusal than
expressed in statutory and other standards. See 5 U.S.C. § 556.
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development, always toward a more exacting set of recusal
rules for federal judges.
Congress passed the first judicial recusal statute in
1792. 69 It applied only to lower federal courts and included
the familiar requirement that judges who were “concerned in
interest” in the case must recuse themselves. It also added a
prohibition for any judge who “has been counsel for either
party” in the case. 70 From 1792 through 1948, Congress
revised the recusal standards for federal judges on several
occasions, “enlarging the enumerated grounds for seeking
disqualification almost every time.” 71
Congress’s first post-1792 revision occurred in 1821. It
added the requirement that judges recuse when a judge’s
relative appears before the judge as a party. 72 The 1891
amendment prohibited a judge from hearing an appeal of a
case the judge tried in the court below. 73 Twenty years later,
the 1911 Act precluded judges from hearing cases in which
they were a material witness. 74 Roughly one hundred and
twenty years since drafting its first recusal statute, Congress
had identified five scenarios in which recusal was statutorily
required—when a judge has a pecuniary interest in the
proceeding, when the judge served as counsel for either party
in the same case, when a judge’s relative appears before the
judge as a party, when the judge is asked to decide an appeal
from a case they presided over below, or when the judge was
a material witness in the case before her.
Despite these seemingly clear standards, litigants still

69. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 25, § 11, 1 Stat. 275, 278–79.
70. Id.
71. FLAMM, supra note 14, at 670.
72. Act of Mar. 3, 1821, Pub. L. No. 16-52, 3 Stat. 643, 643.
73. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, Pub. L. No. 51-517, § 3, 26 Stat. 826, 827. This 1891
statute has since been codified as amended and reads, in pertinent part, “no judge
shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by
him.” 28 U.S.C. § 47.
74. Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, § 20, 36 Stat. 1087, 1090.
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faced significant obstacles in seeking to recuse a judge. The
statute required litigants to initiate the recusal process, 75 yet
did not provide any procedural mechanisms for initiating
recusal proceedings. The statute also left recusal decisions to
the challenged judge’s own discretion, requiring recusal only
if the situation would “render it improper, in [the judge’s]
opinion,” to preside over the case. 76 This wide latitude
continued on appeal; a judge’s decision not to recuse was
reviewable only for an abuse of discretion. 77
Section 21 of the 1911 Act, currently codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 144, offered some potential clarity. It allowed a party to
remove a district judge by simply filing an affidavit stating
that the judge has “a personal bias or prejudice” against the
affiant. 78 Section 21 was the first federal statute to offer any
procedural guidelines for seeking recusal. It was also the
first to provide for recusal on a peremptory basis and to use
personal bias as grounds for recusal.
The courts, however, quickly limited its scope. In Berger
v. United States, 79 multiple defendants of German descent
sought to recuse the trial judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
under § 21 due to his alleged bias against Germans. The
issue was whether an affidavit alone would be sufficient to
trigger recusal under the new statute. The Court held that
judges could not question the veracity of the affidavit, but
that they may determine for themselves whether the
allegations, taken as true, support a finding of actual bias or
prejudice on their part. 80 Courts applying Berger construed
the phrase “bias and prejudice” narrowly, severely limiting

75. This is referred to as a “challenge-for-cause” statute. FLAMM, supra note
14, at 670.
76. John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 627 (1947).
77. See FLAMM, supra note 14, at 988.
78. Frank, supra note 76, at 628.
79. 255 U.S. 22 (1921).
80. Id. at 36.
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§ 21’s effectiveness. 81
The federal recusal statute remained unchanged until
1948, when Congress amended § 20 to cover the entire
federal judiciary, including the Supreme Court. The
amended version of § 20, recodified at 28 U.S.C. § 455, has
become the “principal” federal recusal statute. 82 In fact, it is
often (wrongly) referred to as the only federal recusal
statute, largely because its primary competitors, § 144 and
§ 47, deal exclusively with trial courts and address only a
narrow subset of the accepted grounds for recusal. 83 The
1948 amendments to § 455 expanded the statute’s scope to
include Supreme Court Justices and required recusal where
a judge or justice had been a material witness, had been of
counsel, or was related to an attorney or party in the case. 84
Most importantly, Congress modified the personal interest
standard to apply only in cases where a judge or justice had
a substantial interest in the case. The amendments did not,
however, limit judicial discretion in making recusal
decisions, or tighten the standard of review for those

81. Frank, supra note 76, at 629. Section 21 of the 1911 Act was recodified in
1948 in almost precisely the same form. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Section 144’s definition
of “bias and prejudice” continues to be narrowly construed by the courts and
applies only to federal district judges.
82. In terms of its impact on current recusal law, § 455 “has frequently been
referred to as the ‘principal’ or ‘comprehensive’ federal judicial disqualification
statute . . . . In fact, some courts have issued decisions which appear to reflect the
belief that § 455 is the only federal disqualification statute.” FLAMM, supra note
14, at 678.
83. As discussed above, courts have construed § 144 extremely narrowly,
making it effectively useless for litigants seeking to recuse an otherwise
unwilling judge. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. Section 47
prohibits judges from serving as appellate judges in cases where they also served
as the trial judge. 28 U.S.C. § 47. While there is no evidence that the courts have
sought to unduly limit the application of § 47, the fact that it is explicitly limited
to cases where judges are hearing appeals from their own cases is both narrowing
in its own right as well as potentially redundant with the reasonableness
standard of § 455: “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1948).
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decisions on appeal. Recusal was still required only when it
would be “improper, in [the judge’s] opinion” for the judge to
sit in the case, and a judge’s recusal decision could still only
be reversed on appeal when it represented an abuse of
discretion. 85 Section 455 also did not offer any procedural
guidance for litigants seeking recusal. Unlike § 144’s
detailed procedural framework for how and when a party
may go about disqualifying a judge, § 455 operated in purely
substantive terms, and more narrowly than before, as it only
required recusal when the judge’s “substantial” financial
interests were implicated. 86
The next, and last, amendment to § 455 was in 1974. The
“substantial” financial interest standard from 1948 changed
to “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small,”
in the subject matter of the case at hand. 87 It also required
that a judge or justice recuse themselves in instances of
personal bias, previous involvement in (or knowledge of) the
case at hand, familial and other personal relationships, and
in any case where a judge’s “impartiality might reasonably
be questioned” (the “reasonable appearance standard”). 88
This standard is a popular and relatively new development
in American recusal law. 89 The reasonable appearance
standard was designed to promote public confidence in the
judiciary by ensuring that cases are decided by individuals

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4), (d)(4) (1974).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The reasonable appearance standard was added to the
statute in 1974 and represented a significant departure from traditional AngloAmerican recusal law. In fact, prior to the addition of the “reasonable
appearance” standard to § 455 in 1974, American recusal law had generally
operated consistently with Blackstone’s maxim that “the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge.” 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1768).
89. See FLAMM, supra note 14, at 9 (“[B]ecause of the importance of assuring
both litigants and the public at large that judges are impartial . . . virtually every
commentator who has critically analyzed the subject of judicial disqualification
has applauded its expansion.”).
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who are not only impartial in fact, but who appear so to the
people affected by, and expected to comply with, their
decisions. 90
The historical development of the current federal recusal
statute is important because it reveals how the American
concept of judicial recusal has evolved over the last two
centuries. Far from the pecuniary interest standard that
reigned at the Founding, current recusal law addresses a
range of conduct and situations far beyond the Due Process
Clause’s probability of actual bias standard. Also, unlike the
Due Process Clause, which applies to all government
adjudicators, the federal recusal statute applies only to
“[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United
States.” It does not apply to administrative adjudicators.
Federal courts have interpreted the reasonable appearance
standard as too broad for adjudicators who are employed by
the very agencies that could appear before them. 91 For that
reason alone, § 455 cannot be understood to govern
administrative recusal. It does, however, represent a
potentially useful example of why agencies may desire to
take public perception into account when seeking to protect
the integrity of their adjudications.
C. Model Codes of Conduct
Model codes of conduct are a valuable source of insight
into the legal profession’s views on recusal. The ABA’s Model
Canons of Judicial Ethics (Model Canons) first appeared in

90. VIRELLI, supra note 40, at xii (“By guarding against the mere appearance
of impropriety, recusal advances public confidence in the integrity and legitimacy
of an otherwise unaccountable judiciary.”).
91. See Greenberg v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 968 F.2d 164,
167 (2d Cir. 1992). This perspective on administrative recusal also reinforces the
notion that the federal recusal statute is broader than the Due Process Clause. It
is indisputable that due process governs agency adjudicators, but it is also
commonly understood that the reasonable appearance standard of § 455 is too
broad to cover administrative actors. These two things are only possible if the
statutory standard covers activity not prohibited by due process.
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1924 in response to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis’s
appointment as commissioner of Major League Baseball
after the Chicago Black Sox cheating scandal in 1919.
Although not technically illegal, 92 controversy around Judge
Landis simultaneously serving as a federal judge and
baseball commissioner inspired talk of impeachment and the
development of the Model Canons. 93 The ABA was concerned
with the appearance of impropriety created by a federal
judge receiving compensation from another employer. As a
result, the newly adopted Canon 4 stated that “[a] judge’s
conduct should be free from impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety.” 94
Although the 1924 Canons expanded the bounds of
recusal at the time by incorporating concerns about the
appearance of impropriety among judges, their impact
should not be overstated. For one thing, they were not legally
enforceable. 95 They also did not contain any procedural
guidelines for how recusal matters should be decided and did
92. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer explained that “[t]here seems to be
nothing as a matter of general law which would prohibit a district judge from
receiving additional compensation for other than strictly judicial service, such as
acting as arbitrator or commissioner.” DAVID PIETRUSZA, JUDGE AND JURY: THE
LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS 197 (1998).
93. The ABA voted to censure Judge Landis on September 1, 1924 for
maintaining dual employment while a member of the federal bench. AM. BAR
ASS’N, TRANSACTIONS OF THE FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, 61–67 (1921). The ABA’s censure of Judge Landis was
reprinted in the New York Times. Bar Meeting Votes Censure of Landis, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1921, at 1. On February 2, 1921, a resolution was introduced in
the House of Representatives calling for Judge Landis’s impeachment. Id. The
bill was defeated in the Senate by a tie vote. Bill Aimed at Landis Fails, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 1921, at 13.
94. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS r. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pi
c_migrated/1924_canons.pdf. The other Canons that are relevant to judicial
recusal were far less revolutionary. For example, Canon 13 explained that “[a]
judge should not act in a controversy where a near relative is a party,” and Canon
29 explained that a judge should avoid presiding over cases “in which his personal
interests are involved.” Id. at r. 13, 29.
95. See Debra Lyn Bassett, Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1213, 1229–30 (2002).
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not use mandatory language. Canon 4 states that “a judge’s
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety,”
implying that there are some instances in which an
appearance of impropriety may be acceptable. 96
The next four decades saw little change in the Model
Canons. By the end of the 1960s, the development within the
federal judiciary of the “duty to sit”—a presumption against
recusal in close cases 97—and some high-profile ethical
controversies involving sitting and prospective Supreme
Court justices sparked a renewed focus on recusal
standards. 98 In August 1969, the ABA convened a Special
96. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS r. 4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1924), https://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/pi
c_migrated/1924_canons.pdf.
97. In Edwards v. United States, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed defendants’ convictions for failing to pay a federal gambling tax. 334
F.2d 360, 362 (1964). The case was granted rehearing en banc, but two members
of the original panel were unable to participate in that hearing. See id. at 362 n.2.
Judge Hays, who wrote the majority opinion for the panel, had been sitting by
designation from another circuit and was thus statutorily precluded from
participating in the en banc hearing. Id. Judge Cameron, who concurred with
Judge Hays to form the panel majority, died before the en banc argument. Id. In
light of these unusual circumstances, the dissenting judge from the panel, Judge
Revis, considered disqualifying himself to avoid the appearance of unfairness, but
declined after consulting with his colleagues. Id. Finding no statutory prohibition
on his participation, Judge Revis concluded that “[i]t is a judge’s duty to refuse to
sit when he is disqualified but it is equally his duty to sit when there is no valid
reason for recusation.” Id. In addition to operating as a presumption against
recusal in traditional cases, the duty to sit also had potential consequences for
appellate review of recusal decisions, as appellate courts that recognized the duty
to sit (which was all of them as of 1972) would find it even more difficult to
conclude that a judge had abused their discretion by failing to recuse. See Laird
v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972).
98. Justice Abe Fortas was forced to resign from his position on the Court
under public pressure resulting from his personal and financial relationship with
Louis E. Wolfson, a businessman who had been convicted of illegal stock
manipulations. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS 10, 219
(1999). Recusal had a direct impact on President Nixon’s scuttled appointment of
Judge Clement Haynsworth to the Supreme Court. During his confirmation
process, “it came to light that [Judge Haynsworth] had failed to recuse himself
from several cases in which he held stock in one of the parties.” VIRELLI, supra
note 40, at 11. “[T]he backlash over his perceived lack of judgment and the
resultant appearance of impropriety played a significant role in his failing to be
confirmed by the Senate.” Id.
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Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct to revise the
existing ABA Canons. 99 The result was a Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (Model Code). Canon 3C closely resembled
the 1948 version of the federal recusal statute. The most
prominent changes from the statute were the elimination of
the “substantial” qualifier from the requirement that a judge
recuse when they have a “financial interest in the subject
matter” before the court, and requirements that a judge
recuse from “a proceeding in which his impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to” cases
of actual bias or personal interest in the case, or cases in
which the judge had served as a lawyer in the case or was
related to the parties or their lawyers. 100 Despite all of its
reformative qualities, the 1972 revisions to the ABA’s Model
Code were just that—revisions to a model code that did not
carry the force of law.
In 1973, at least in part due to a highly unusual
memorandum from then-Justice Rehnquist explaining his
decision not to recuse from a high-profile case, 101 the Judicial
99. Irving R. Kaufmann, Lions or Jackals: The Function of a Code of Judicial
Ethics, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 & n.4 (1970).
100. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3C (AM. BAR ASS’N 1972), reprinted
in Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 736, 743–44 (1973). The Code also mandated recusal where: a judge was
personally biased; had served as a lawyer in the controversy; had a financial
interest in the outcome of the case; or was within the third degree of relationship
with a party, lawyer, interested person, or material witness in the case. Id.
101. At least one reason for the codification was then-Justice Rehnquist’s
memorandum explaining his refusal to recuse in Laird v Tatum, 409 U.S. 824
(1972) (Rehnquist, J., mem.), a case involving a government program that Justice
Rehnquist had worked on and testified publicly about while a lawyer at the
Justice Department. Laird v Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (merits opinion). Although
the Model Code was in effect at the time, Rehnquist’s memorandum focused
heavily on the more lenient recusal standards in the applicable (1948) version of
§ 455. Although Rehnquist stated that he was aware of the new ABA Model Code,
he declined to address it formally in his memorandum. Laird, 409 U.S. at 825
(“Respondents also cite various draft provisions of [the Model Code] . . . . Since I
do not read these particular provisions as being materially different from the
standards enunciated in the congressional statute [from 1948], there is no
occasion for me to give them separate consideration.”). He did not address
whether his prior involvement with the program could lead to his impartiality
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Conference of the United States adopted the ABA Model
Code as its Code of Conduct for United States Judges (Code
of Conduct). 102 The Judicial Conference is presided over by
the Chief Justice of the United States, 103 and its Code of
Conduct serves a similar function to the ABA’s Model Code.
Like the Model Code, it does not have the force of law, yet it
remains an influential source of ethical guidance for the
federal bench, especially since it was voluntarily adopted by
the federal judiciary to govern its own conduct. 104
Neither the Model Code nor the Code of Conduct apply,
by their own terms, to agency adjudicators. They are
nonetheless important to administrative recusal, because
they serve as a template for ethical guidelines in
administrative adjudication.
The American Bar Association’s (ABA’s) National
Conference of Administrative Law Judges (NCALJ) adopted
its own set of ethical guidelines for ALJs in 1989, which
included recusal standards. The Model Code of Judicial
Conduct for Federal Administrative Law Judges (Model ALJ
Code) was patterned after the ABA’s Model Code, especially
with regard to recusal. Canon 3(C) of the Model ALJ Code
adopted the objective test from the Model Code, which was
also codified in the federal recusal statute, by requiring
recusal whenever an ALJ’s “impartiality might reasonably
be questioned.” 105
being questioned within the meaning of Canon 3 of the 1972 Model Code, because
he did not read Canon 3 as adding anything “materially different” from § 455. Id.
102. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES APRIL 5–6, 1973, at 10 (1973),
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference/Proceedings/Proceed
ings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1973-04.pdf.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 331.
104. Importantly, the expansion of federal recusal standards embodied in the
Model Code and Code of Conduct were codified in the 1974 amendments to § 455.
See discussion supra Section II.B (describing the history and scope of the primary
federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
JUDGES Canon 3(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989).
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But like its judicial analogs, the Model ALJ Code is only
suggestive. It is not legally binding on ALJs by its own terms
and has not been codified by Congress. 106 It has also not
shown the staying power of the Model Code. The Model Code
has been updated several times since 1989, while the Model
ALJ Code has not. In 2007, the Model Code was expanded to
explicitly include ALJs, 107 but only to the extent that
individual jurisdictions deemed it desirable. 108 At least some
jurisdictions have resisted. The Ninth Circuit, for example,
has held that the Model Code did not apply to ALJs from the
Social Security Administration (SSA), the agency that
employs by far the largest number of ALJs, because the SSA
itself had not adopted the Code and none of the ABA Model
Codes “create[] legally enforceable duties.” 109
In 2010, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws adopted the Revised Model State
Administrative Procedure Act (Model State APA). The Model
State APA requires “disqualification for bias, prejudice,
financial interest, ex parte communications . . . or any other
factor that would cause a reasonable person to question the
impartiality” of the adjudicator and allows parties to
“petition for the disqualification of a presiding officer” in
their own case. 110 Despite being aligned with federal judicial
106. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR FED. ADMIN. L. JUDGES Preface
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1989) (“Adaption and endorsement of the Model Code for
Administrative Law Judge[s] by NCALJ does not make that Code applicable to
any administrative law judge . . . .”); Steven A. Glazer, Toward a Model Code of
Judicial Conduct for Federal Administrative Law Judges, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 337,
340 (2012).
107. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Application § I(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“A
judge, within the meaning of this Code, is anyone who is authorized to perform
judicial functions, including . . . [a] member of the administrative law judiciary.”).
108. See id. at n.1 (“Each jurisdiction should consider the characteristics of
particular positions within the administrative law judiciary in adopting,
adapting, applying, and enforcing the Code for the administrative law
judiciary.”).
109. Lowry v. Barnhart, 329 F.3d 1019, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2003).
110. REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 402(c)–(d) (NAT’L CONF. ON
COMM’RS OF UNIF. STATE L. 2010), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic
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recusal standards, the Model State APA is not itself legally
binding and is applicable only to state actors, including state
agency adjudicators. In 2018, the NCALJ adopted the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct for State Administrative Law
Judges (Model State ALJ Code). Like the Model State APA,
although the Model State ALJ Code does not apply to federal
adjudicators, it advocates for essentially the same recusal
standards as the other codes, including for recusal where a
state ALJ’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 111
ACUS recently published revised Model Adjudication
Rules (ACUS Model Rules). 112 The ACUS Model Rules
require that an agency adjudicator “conduct her/his
functions in an impartial manner.” 113 They also require
recusal on the grounds of “personal bias” or “basis for other
disqualification.” 114 Like the model codes described above,
however, the ACUS Model Rules are only suggestive; they
recommend that agencies adopt them, but provide no other
legal obligations or remedies on their own. 115 They are also
likely narrower than the Model ALJ Code. The “basis for
other disqualification” standard could include the reasonable
appearance standard but is less explicit than the model codes
on that point. In light of the number of other model codes
that have expressly adopted the reasonable appearance
language, there are good reasons not to read the ACUS
Model Code’s reference to the “basis for other
disqualification” as including the reasonable appearance
/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=3ab796d4-9636-d85648e5-b638021eb54d.
111. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. L. JUDGES Canon 2,
r. 2.11(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/judicial_division/2018-model-code-statealj.pdf.
112. MODEL ADJUDICATION RULES (ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S. 2018),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Model%20Adjudication%20R
ules%209.13.18%20ACUS_0.pdf.
113. Id. r. 112(A).
114. Id. r. 112(B)(2)(a).
115. See id. at vi (“[T]he Working Group encourages agencies to adopt the
revised [Model Adjudication Rules] in toto . . . .”).
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standard.
Taken together, the model codes and rules offer some
important insight into modern thinking about the best way
to effectuate recusal of judges as well as agency adjudicators.
In terms of scope, model recusal requirements have, as they
did in the federal statute between 1792 and 1948,
consistently “enlarg[ed] the enumerated grounds for seeking
disqualification,” 116 such that the model codes and rules
support recusal in many more cases than due process
requires. This is important, because it supports the
conclusion that agency adjudicators are concerned about
more than the negative effect of a partial adjudicator on the
parties to that hearing. The fact that all three model codes
require recusal where an adjudicator’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, that is regardless of whether
actual bias or even a probability of actual bias would exist in
the mind of a reasonable judge, confirms that the public’s
perception of the integrity of the proceeding is important to
agency adjudicators and other members of the profession.
This is further corroborated by specific canons in each model
code explicitly requiring judges to promote public confidence
in their conduct. 117
There are, however, some obvious limitations to relying
solely on the codes and rules as a template for adopting
agency-specific recusal standards. Even those codes that
purport to apply to agency adjudicators are only applicable
to ALJs, as opposed to adjudicators presiding over Type B
adjudications or appellate-style review hearings, and none of
the model codes and rules are directly enforceable as a
matter of law. Moreover, despite the invitation to adopt the
Model Judicial Code and the ACUS Model Rules, most
116. FLAMM, supra note 14, at 670.
117. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. L. JUDGES r. 1.2
(AM.
BAR
ASS’N
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publications/judicial_division/2018-model-code-statealj.pdf; MODEL CODE OF
JUD. CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR
FED. ADMIN. L. JUDGES Canon 2.A (AM. BAR ASS’N 1989).
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agencies have declined to do so. 118 This indicates that,
although the benefits of broader recusal standards are real,
a generalized, one-size-fits-all approach to administrative
recusal is not the optimal approach to addressing recusal
concerns in agency evidentiary hearings.
D. Government Ethics Provisions
Recusal is largely (although not exclusively) an ethical
issue, and agency adjudicators are part of the executive
branch. 119 As a result, the legal infrastructure for dealing
with ethical issues within the executive branch workforce are
potentially instructive for agency recusal standards. In
addition to statutory requirements, the Office of Government
Ethics (OGE) has responsibility for interpreting and
promulgating ethical standards. OGE is an executive agency
headed by a director who is appointed by the president with
the advice and consent of the Senate. 120 OGE may
promulgate “rules and regulations . . . pertaining to conflicts
of interest and ethics in the executive branch,” including
those “pertaining to the identification and resolution of
conflicts of interest.” 121
118.See LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, ADMINISTRATIVE RECUSAL RULES: A TAXONOMY AND
STUDY OF EXISTING RECUSAL STANDARDS FOR AGENCY ADJUDICATORS 22 (2020)
(noting that “a small group of agency rules include all of the[] features [of judicial
recusal],” by “referring to model codes or canons of judicial ethics”),
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Virelli%20ACUS%20Part%2
0II%20FINAL%20-%20June%2023%20%282nd%20release%2C%20cover%20she
et%29.pdf.
119. Recusal’s role in promoting public confidence in the integrity of agency
adjudication is more of an institutional, rather than an ethical, benefit.
120. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 401(a)–(b).
121. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 402(b)(1)–(2). OGE has a somewhat unique enforcement
structure. According to the agency website, OGE oversees the executive branch
ethics program, but the program is a shared responsibility. Mission, Authority, &
Key Players, U.S. OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS https://www.oge.gov/web/oge.nsf
/ethicsofficials_mission (last visited Dec. 21, 2021). In its supervisory capacity,
OGE “sets policy for the entire executive branch ethics program.” Id. The head of
each agency is statutorily responsible for leading the program in their agency. Id.
The agency head is also responsible for selecting a Designated Agency Ethics
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1. Ethics Statutes
The primary criminal statute relating to the recusal of
agency adjudicators is 18 U.S.C. § 208. 122 The statute
prohibits government employees from “participat[ing]
personally and substantially . . . in a judicial or other
proceeding . . . in which, to his knowledge, he [or certain
family or business associates] . . . has a financial interest.” 123
Although only enforceable by the Department of Justice
because it is a criminal statute, OGE has authority under the
Act to “issue uniform regulations for the issuance of waivers
and exemptions under [the Act] which shall . . . provide
guidance with respect to the types of interests that are not
so substantial as to be deemed likely to affect the integrity of
the services the Government may expect from the
employee.” 124 OGE has also issued—at Congress’s request—
a report to the president and Congress on “conflict of interest
laws relating to executive branch employment,” including
§ 208. 125
In that report, OGE described § 208 as “the cornerstone
of the executive branch ethics program. It prohibits an
employee from participating personally and substantially in
any particular matter in which he has a financial interest, or
Official, the employee with primary responsibility for directing the daily
activities of an agency’s ethics program and coordinating with OGE. Id. For a
more detailed discussion of how OGE enforcement mechanisms relate to recusal,
see infra Section II.D.4.
122. Sections 203 and 205 of title 18 also outline conflicts of interest that could
lead to disqualification or recusal, but the subject matter of those sections—
prohibiting “Federal employees from representing private interests before the
Government”—are less likely to affect adjudicators, who are generally in a
deciding, rather than a representational role, in agency adjudications. OFF. OF
GOV’T ETHICS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES ON
THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS RELATING TO EXECUTIVE BRANCH EMPLOYMENT 2
(2006) [hereinafter OGE REPORT], https://www.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/F3127FD
1FD0A2415852585B6005A126D/$FILE/fb1bb9d5af124e6ca85c3cab2db6ac582.p
df.
123. 18 U.S.C. § 208(a).
124. 18 U.S.C. § 208(d)(2).
125. OGE REPORT, supra note 122, at 1.
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in which certain others with whom he is associated [spouse,
minor child, general partner, etc.] have a financial
interest.” 126 OGE has made clear that § 208 requires
disqualification from “any ‘judicial or other proceeding’ . . .
even if that financial interest is insubstantial.” 127 Although
it also contains some limiting provisions, the relevant feature
of the statute is that it requires disqualification of agency
adjudicators in a relatively narrow, and well-covered, set of
circumstances—a direct financial interest in the
adjudication by the adjudicator or a small group of people
close to the adjudicator. 128 Since this standard is consistent
with the longstanding requirement—at common law, under
the Due Process Clause, and in every federal recusal statute
and ethics code since the Founding—that judges may not
preside over cases in which they have a direct financial
interest, § 208 adds little if anything to the present
consideration of administrative recusal. 129
2. Ethics Regulations
OGE has also issued specific ethics regulations that
apply to members of the executive branch, including, but not
limited to, agency adjudicators. The OGE regulation that
most directly applies to recusal of administrative

126. Id. at 28.
127. Id. at 29.
128. The statute requires that the employee have knowledge of the
disqualifying financial interest. It also permits employees to seek waivers from
the official who appointed them and allows OGE to promulgate regulatory
exemptions for classes of financial interest deemed too remote or inconsequential
to merit disqualification. Id. (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 208(a)–(b)).
129. That is not to say that the statute is not a valuable contribution to
government ethics more broadly. Recall that the statute applies to all government
employees, not just the categories of agency adjudicators discussed here. A
comparison to judicial recusal standards is only relevant in cases where executive
employees perform tasks closely analogous to those of traditional judges. The fact
that § 208 may be redundant when applied to that group of adjudicators does not
in any way denigrate its contributions with regard to the remaining (and,
incidentally, the vast majority of) federal employees covered by the statute.
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adjudicators can be found at 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 (§ 502). 130
Section 502(a) states that an employee “should not
participate” in a matter where the employee knows either
that they have a direct financial interest in the matter or
that a person with whom the employee “has a covered
relationship is or represents a party” and the “circumstances
would cause a reasonable person . . . to question his
impartiality in the matter.” 131
Section 502(a)’s standard is not designed specifically for
adjudicators presiding over evidentiary hearings and, as
such, does not take into account the full range of issues that
can arise in that quasi-judicial setting. The objective nature
of the test in § 502(a) is analogous to the broad appearance
standard in the federal recusal statute and the model codes
mentioned above, but it is substantively limited to
appearances resulting from financial interests and covered

130. Section 502 was the culmination of a long process that included the
development of OGE’s Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the
Executive Branch (Standards of Ethical Conduct) and of fourteen ethical
principles for government employees. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.101 (2021). In 1989,
President Bush signed Executive Order 12,674, 54 Fed. Reg. 15,159, 15,159–62
(Apr. 12, 1989), which put into action a recommendation by the President’s
Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform to replace individual agency
standards with “a single set of regulations” applicable to all employees of the
executive branch. THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON FED. ETHICS L. REFORM, TO SERVE
WITH HONOR: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE PRESIDENT 11 (1989) (“The
Commission recommends that the Office of Government Ethics be directed by
executive order to consolidate all executive branch standards of conduct
regulations into a single set of regulations.”). Executive Order 12,674, as modified
the following year by Executive Order 12,731, set out fourteen ethical principles
for executive branch employees and tasked OGE with creating a “single,
comprehensive, and clear set of executive branch standards of ethical conduct.”
Exec. Order No. 12,731, 55 Fed. Reg. 42,547, 42,547–50 (Oct. 17, 1990). Two years
later, on August 7, 1992, OGE published its Standards of Ethical Conduct, which
were eventually codified in 5 C.F.R. Part 2635, where section 502 currently
resides. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502 (2021); see also Our History, U.S. OFF. OF
GOVERNMENTAL ETHICS, https://oge.gov/web/oge.nsf/about_our-history (last
visited Nov. 26, 2021) (“In 1992, at the direction of President George H.W. Bush,
OGE established the Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the
Executive Branch.”).
131. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a) (2021).
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relationships. 132 Section 502(a) is further limited by its
suggestive (“should not participate”), rather than
mandatory, language. 133
Finally, § 502(a)(2) allows for an employee to seek advice
on whether they should participate in a given matter if
“circumstances other than those specifically described in this
section would raise a question regarding his impartiality.” 134
This language could certainly be used to trigger recusals in
a wider range of cases than the language in § 502(a), but it
could only do so at the behest of the recused employee, and
even then, is only suggestive. The purely voluntary nature of
§ 502(a)(2) makes it an inadequate substitute for mandatory,
agency-specific recusal standards, because relying on an
employee’s judgment to bring about his own recusal does not
instill the same measure of public confidence in the integrity
of the proceeding.
In addition to § 502, OGE can work with agencies to
promulgate any supplementary regulations that the agency
deems “necessary and appropriate . . . to fulfill the purposes”
of the existing OGE regulations. 135 Supplemental
regulations could be a useful vehicle for adopting agencyspecific recusal standards, but a review of the current list of
supplemental regulations did not reveal any supplemental
regulations pertaining specifically to agency adjudicators, let
alone to administrative recusal. 136

132. See id. The scope of covered relationships that could trigger
disqualification is limited largely to financial/employment and familial
relationships. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(b)(1)(i)–(v) (2021).
133. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a), (a)(2) (2021).
134. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.502(a)(2) (2021).
135. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.105 (2021).
136. For a more detailed discussion of the reasons for and against using OGE
regulations to address agency-specific recusal questions, see infra Parts III and
IV.
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3. General Principles
OGE has also promulgated a list of 14 General Principles
that, it explains, “apply to every employee and may form the
basis for the standards contained in this part.” 137 It goes on
to explain that where a situation is not covered by a specific
ethical standard, “employees shall apply the principles . . . in
determining whether their conduct is proper.” 138
Principle fourteen refers to employees creating an
appearance of impropriety, and on that basis could be seen
as supporting a broader approach to agency recusal than that
articulated in § 502. The text of principle fourteen, however,
stops short of opening the door to a wide-ranging appearance
standard by being both aspirational and tethered to existing
law. It states that “employees shall endeavor to avoid . . .
creating the appearance that they are violating the law or
ethical standards set forth in this part.” 139 Although the
principle’s focus on appearances may be a bit broader than
§ 502, it is tethered too closely to the substantive provision of
that section to meaningfully expand recusal requirements for
agency adjudicators.
4. Enforcement
It is not only the substantive standards that distinguish
federal ethics laws and regulations from more traditional
judicial recusal standards. Ethical violations carry a wider
range of consequences than recusal. Recusal is a remedy
unto itself—it describes a situation wherein an adjudicator
is not fit to participate in a proceeding and then removes the
adjudicator from that proceeding. It is not at all punitive, nor
is it meant to be. This is reflected in the centuries-old,
unbroken history of judges making their own recusal

137. 14 General Principles, OFF. OF GOV’T ETHICS (May 7, 2009),
https://www.oge.gov/web/OGE.nsf/0/CF823CA93BF7562A85258711006D29E4/$
FILE/14%20General%20Principles.pdf.
138. Id.
139. Id. (emphasis added).
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decisions in the first instance. 140 Maintaining recusal as a
judicial decision permits judges to police themselves, which
in turn not only promotes public confidence in the judiciary—
an express goal of recusal doctrine—but also preserves
judicial independence by insulating judges from outsiders
using recusal as a tool for forum shopping or a source of
undue influence on judicial conduct in general. 141
By contrast, violations of OGE’s Standards of Conduct,
which include § 502, 142 “may be cause for . . . corrective or
disciplinary action” against an employee by the agency. 143 In
addition to recusal, disciplinary action for violating OGE
regulations can include “reprimand, suspension, demotion,
and removal.” 144 Although there is little evidence of recusal
inquiries resulting in such disciplinary actions, the fact that
both are resolved by the affected agency’s Designated Agency
Ethics Official, rather than the adjudicators themselves, and
that there is the possibility of disciplinary action, rather than
merely recusal and replacement of the adjudicator, provides
yet another reason why OGE’s ethics regime is not an
adequate substitute for administrative recusal.

140. See Louis J. Virelli III, The (Un)Constitutionality of Supreme Court
Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1195 (“In pre-Revolutionary England
and America, recusal decisions were the product of judge-made common law; the
standards for establishing whether a judge could participate in a case were
developed and applied within the judicial branch.”).
141. As a reminder, because recusal decisions are reviewable on appeal, the
threat of judges abusing their authority to make their own recusal decisions is
contained. As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, this is not true for courts of
last resort, but that is beyond the scope of the current discussion. See generally
VIRELLI, supra note 40 (arguing that separation of powers principles forbid
Congress from establishing binding recusal standards for the Supreme Court).
Administrative recusal is more like recusal in the lower courts, even as it applies
to agency heads, because it is still eligible (much like other final agency action)
for judicial review. See infra Part IV (discussing judicial review of agency recusal
decisions).
142. See supra note 130 (describing the history of § 502’s enactment).
143. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.106(a) (2021).
144. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.102(g) (2021) (defining “disciplinary action” for purposes
of Part 2635).
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E. Administrative Recusal Statutes and Regulations
Unlike the federal recusal statute and OGE regulations,
there are statutory and regulatory standards that are
specifically directed at agency adjudicators.
1. The APA
Section 556(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) requires that evidentiary hearings under the APA
(what are traditionally referred to as “formal adjudication”)
“shall be conducted in an impartial manner.” The Asimow
Study identifies the various forms of bias that § 556(b) is
designed to prevent—financial interests, personal animus,
and prejudgment of adjudicative facts—and makes a
persuasive case for why agencies should consider
promulgating recusal regulations to prevent these types of
bias from affecting their adjudications. 145 ACUS
recommendation 2016-4 adopts the Asimow Study’s
suggestion that the three types of bias targeted by § 556(b)
should be prohibited in agency-specific procedural
regulations. 146
There are two reasons why § 556(b)’s bias standard does
not occupy the entire field of administrative recusal. First, it
by definition only applies to adjudicators governed by §§ 556
and 557 of the APA, which represent a minority of the
adjudicators included in this study. 147 Second, it does not
address appearances of bias or partiality that could affect

145. ASIMOW, supra note 17, at 23.
146. Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings
Not Required by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94,315
(Dec. 23, 2016).
147. Kent H. Barnett, Some Kind of Hearing Officer, 94 WASH. L. REV. 515, 522
(2019) (“Non-ALJs outnumber . . . ALJs by more than 5:1.”). It is true that
recommendation 2016-4 states that those same bias standards should be applied
to non-ALJ adjudication, but this does not amount to a statutory standard for
purposes of outlining the existing landscape of administrative recusal. Admin.
Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2016-4, Evidentiary Hearings Not Required
by the Administrative Procedure Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 94,314, 94, 315 (Dec. 23, 2016).
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public perception, even if those appearances do not in fact
skew the outcome of the adjudication. While the reasonable
appearance standard may not be as readily applied to agency
adjudication as to federal courts, some consideration of the
impact of adjudicators’ conduct on public confidence in
administrative adjudication may be not only appropriate, but
also beneficial.
The salience of public confidence in agency adjudication
is reflected in the increased attention paid to adjudicator
independence in recent scholarship. Professors Richard Levy
and Robert Glicksman recently outlined a growing and
dynamic set of threats to ALJ independence and suggested
bold structural changes to protect ALJs, 148 and Professor
Kent Barnett recently argued for a disclosure regime for nonALJ adjudicators that is designed to inform Congress,
agencies, and administrative litigants of potential threats to
adjudicator impartiality. 149 Both of these approaches
address important issues of adjudicator independence akin
to the actual bias standard in § 556(b) of the APA. But like
§ 556(b), they do not focus on how gaps in adjudicator
independence may impact the general public’s perception of
that adjudication’s legitimacy. While certainly related,
concerns about public perception raise theoretically and
practically distinct concerns about the integrity of agency
action that the APA itself does not address. 150
2. Agency-Specific Regulations
Notwithstanding the effects of due process, the federal
recusal statute, model codes, various ethics provisions, and
the APA, some agencies have still taken it upon themselves
to establish their own recusal standards. The very existence
of such standards makes two important points. First, at least
148. Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Restoring ALJ Independence, 105
MINN. L. REV. 39, 45 (2020).
149. Barnett, supra note 147, at 563–81.
150. For a more detailed discussion of how agency recusal rules can promote
public confidence in agency adjudication, see infra Section III.B.

1372

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

some agencies believe that their adjudicators’ recusal
practices are not definitively governed by external sources of
law or policy, that is there was a gap in administrative
recusal law that needed filling. Second, the choice by some
agencies to include the reasonable appearance standard in
their recusal regulations shows that public confidence in the
integrity of their adjudications is important to the agency
and worth protecting through recusal.
A taxonomy and tabulation of the specific recusal
standards adopted by individual agencies is the topic of a
separate project. 151 For present purposes, it is enough to note
that agency recusal rules occupy a broad spectrum. On one
end are agencies with either no written standards or highly
discretionary standards that require recusal only
whenadjudicators “deem it necessary.” 152 On the other end of
the spectrum are standards that approximate the judicial
recusal statute, often by requiring recusal for violations of
the Code of Judicial Conduct. 153 The middle portion of the
151. See generally Louis J. Virelli III, Recusal in Administrative Adjudication,
64 ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (relying substantially on another ACUS
report by the author titled Administrative Recusal Rules: A Taxonomy and Study
of Existing Recusal Standards for Agency Adjudicators, cited supra note 118).
152. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(g)(1) (2021) (“When an Administrative Law
Judge deems himself disqualified to preside in a particular proceeding, he shall
withdraw therefrom by notice on the record and shall notify the Director of
Administrative Law Judges of such withdrawal.”); BARNETT ET AL., supra note 10,
at 50 (finding that less than half of the non-ALJ types identified in that study
were subject to recusal regulations, according to their agencies, and that more
than a third of the non-ALJs that were required to recuse based their recusal
decisions on agency custom).
153. See 43 C.F.R. § 4.1122 (2021) (“Administrative law judges shall adhere to
the ‘Code of Judicial Conduct.’”); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 2, r 2.11
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2011) (echoing the language of the federal judicial recusal statute,
28 U.S.C. § 455). The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and Social
Security Administration (SSA) represent hybrid structures with similar effects.
The MSPB promulgated a regulation requiring recusal “on the basis of personal
bias or other disqualification,” 5 C.F.R. § 1201.42(b) (2021), but referred to the
federal recusal statute’s reasonable appearance standard when reviewing an
adjudicator’s denial of a party’s motion to recuse. See Shoaf v. Dep’t of Agric., 97
M.S.P.R. 68, 73 (2004).
The SSA has among the most developed set of recusal standards. It has adopted
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spectrum is populated with recusal standards that are more
targeted to specific indications of partiality, such as an
adjudicator’s financial interest or personal relationship with
a party 154 or their prior involvement with the case. 155
While the details of existing agency regulations are
beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
neither the existence of recusal regulations, nor their
content, demonstrate any consistency of thought or approach
to the issue across different agencies. Despite at least some
agencies’ apparent interest in treating recusal independently
from other ethics provisions, and even in employing the
reasonable
appearance
standard,
their
approach
demonstrates that additional guidance regarding agencyspecific recusal standards could prove useful. Parts III and
IV that follow are thus dedicated to exploring the potential
benefits of specific recusal rules, the procedures by which
those rules should be adopted and enforced, and some of the
structural features that could affect an individual agency’s
choices about its own approach to recusal.

different standards for different adjudicators, some of which are regulatory and
some of which are contained in sub-regulatory guidance documents. The SSA’s
recusal practices for ALJs are governed by regulation. Recusal is required when
an ALJ “is prejudiced or partial with respect to any party or has any interest in
the matter pending for decision.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.940, 416.1440 (2021). Its
Program Operations Manual System (POMS) contains agency guidance requiring
recusal of Disability Hearing Officers (DHOs). The POMS requires DHOs to
recuse when they have sufficient familiarity with the participants in the
proceedings that a reasonable observer “would perceive a substantial likelihood
that the DHO cannot make an impartial decision.” Program Operations Manual
System (POMS) DI 33015.045A, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0433015045. According to the agency,
it is currently developing guidance on recusal of appellate-level officers that will
be at least procedurally different from its other recusal standards.
154. See 40 C.F.R. § 164.40(a) (2021) (EPA); 7 C.F.R. § 47.11(a) (2021)
(Agriculture).
155. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.39(b)(3) (2021) (stating that PTO hearing officers “shall
not be an individual who has participated in any manner in the decision to
initiate the proceedings and shall not have been employed under the immediate
supervision of the [subject of the disciplinary proceeding]”).
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III. THE VALUE OF AGENCY-SPECIFIC RECUSAL STANDARDS
The legal provisions and agency practice regarding
recusal indicate that well-developed, agency-specific recusal
rules could benefit agency adjudication, both by protecting
litigants from biased decision-makers and by advancing
public confidence in the integrity of the adjudicative process.
Those rules should be published in the Federal Register and
Code of Federal Regulations to provide notice to the parties
and the general public that the agency is concerned with
proceedings that are fair and impartial, and that appear so
to the reasonable observer. 156 Publication also makes it
easier for parties to enforce the recusal standards, 157 which
further serves the goals of protecting the parties and
promoting public confidence in the proceedings.
A. Dealing with Actual or Probable Bias
A combination of due process protections, APA
impartiality requirements, and OGE ethical protections are
relatively effective at checking actual adjudicator bias and,
in many cases, at preventing a reasonable probability of such
bias. 158 As the Asimow Study suggests, agencies should
continue to be vigilant, however, in promulgating rules to
protect parties from biased adjudicators. 159 The Supreme
Court has made clear that “most matters relating to judicial
disqualification [do] not rise to a constitutional level,” 160 and
the APA’s impartiality requirement does not apply to the

156. See also Admin. Conf. of the U.S., Recommendation 2018-5, Public
Availability of Adjudication Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 2,139, 2,142 (Feb. 6, 2019)
(recommending publication on agency websites).
157. See infra Part IV (discussing private causes of action under agencyspecific recusal regulations).
158. See discussion supra Sections II.A, B, D.
159. See ASIMOW, supra note 17, at 23.
160. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting FTC
v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948)).
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multitude of adjudicators who fall outside the statute. 161
Moreover, although OGE’s ethical rules apply to non-ALJ
adjudicators, they focus primarily on financial and relational
conflicts of interest; they do not directly address issues such
as personal animus or prejudgment. While some existing
recusal rules do address actual bias, they do not cover all
agency adjudicators. 162 Additional attention to agencyspecific rules could help ensure that all of the forms of bias
targeted by both the APA and OGE are addressed for nonAPA adjudicators. 163
B. The Appearance of Impartiality
Agency-specific recusal regulations stand to benefit
agency adjudication most clearly through their role in
promoting public confidence in the integrity of adjudicative
proceedings. There is good reason to believe that agencies
already take the appearance of impartiality very seriously
when conducting adjudications, and there is likewise good
reason to believe that agency adjudication is being conducted
in a fair and impartial manner. Appearances to the contrary
could jeopardize the agency’s reputation and effectiveness by
conveying
inaccurate
negative
information
about
adjudication.
Trans-agency legal restrictions on agency adjudication
do not require that appearances be taken into account when
deciding recusal questions. Due process is focused on the

161. See Barnett, supra note 147, at 521–22.
162. See VIRELLI, supra note 118, at 19–21 (cataloging agency recusal
standards based on actual or personal bias).
163. OGE rules also do not provide for a private cause of action; enforcement
is dependent on an agency’s ethics official being notified of the potential problem
and taking action. This is notably different from traditional recusal
enforcement—and ostensibly from enforcement of agency-specific recusal
regulations—and thus should be taken into account by agencies when
formulating their own policies. For a more detailed development of the reason for
favoring a private cause of action in recusal, see infra Part IV.
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probability of actual bias in a reasonable judge. 164 The
federal recusal statute and model codes offer a broad
reasonable appearance standard, but the statute does not
apply to administrative adjudicators and the codes are
neither self-enforcing nor have they been adopted by most
agencies. 165 Even when they do mention appearances,
government ethics provisions are narrowly tailored to
financial and relational conflicts, 166 and the APA is limited
to ALJ bias. 167
1. Reasons for Agency-Specific Appearance Rules
There is thus a gap in the recusal safety net when it
comes to public perception of agency adjudication, which is
most easily filled by agency-specific recusal rules. Agencies
have good reasons to try to fill that gap with agency-specific
regulations designed to minimize situations in which an
adjudicator’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
First, agencies are already concerned about how their
adjudications are perceived, and, in the absence of publicly
articulated standards, they often adopt internal,
unpublicized measures to project the appearance of
impartiality. 168 Recusal regulations would be more visible,
permanent, and enforceable expressions of that concern.
Second, and related, is the idea that transparency and
clarity amplify and broaden the message. In an increasingly
polarized political environment, in which concerns about the
integrity and independence of agency adjudication continue
to grow in prominence, 169 public statements like regulations
in support of impartiality—and the appearance thereof—can
164. See discussion supra Section II.A.
165. See discussion supra Sections II.B, C.
166. See discussion supra Section II.D.
167. See discussion supra Section II.E.1.
168. BARNETT ET AL., supra note 10, at 50–51 (explaining that, based on a
survey of agencies with non-ALJ adjudicators, “more than a third (11 of 31) of the
non-ALJ types’ [recusal obligations] arise, at least in part, from custom”).
169. See, e.g., WALLACH, supra note 7, at 1, 5.
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be a powerful countermeasure to increasing cynicism about,
and suspicion of, our public institutions. It further stands to
reason that the more prominent and authoritative those
statements—such as published, judicially enforceable
regulations versus other forms of agency guidance or
advice—the more profound the perceived commitment of the
agency to promoting impartiality and the greater the public
response.
Third, promulgating recusal regulations can help
preempt concerns about integrity before they arise. Rather
than seeming reactionary to questions about decisional
independence and impartiality, preemptive recusal rules
send a message that the agency is acting on principle, free
from political pressure. As mentioned above with regard to
transparency, preemptive action may be even more critical
in the current environment of public skepticism and
perceived dissatisfaction with administrative government.
Finally, a broader, appearance-focused approach to
recusal would be consistent with the prevailing view of the
legal profession that its recusal canons should apply to
agency adjudicators, including ALJs. 170 On two separate
occasions, the ABA has taken steps to apply traditional
judicial recusal standards to ALJs. In 1989, it adopted the
Model Code for Administrative Law Judges, which mirrors
the recusal standards for federal judges adopted in the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Conduct and the federal recusal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455. 171 In 2007, the ABA amended its
Model Code of Judicial Conduct to expressly include ALJs,
albeit with some contextual limitations. 172 Although neither
of these codes are legally enforceable, they are evidence of
170. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Application § I(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N
2020).
171. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR FED. ADMIN. L. JUDGES Canon 3(C)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1989).
172. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. I(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007) (“A judge,
within the meaning of this Code, is anyone who is authorized to perform judicial
functions, including . . . [a] member of the administrative law judiciary.”).
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the legal profession’s views regarding administrative
recusal.
2. Additional Factors to Consider
While there is value to agencies promulgating recusal
regulations that seek to promote public confidence in their
adjudicative systems, the regulatory process will not be
identical for every agency. Each agency will need to consider
carefully how to promote recusal’s values without unduly
compromising agency effectiveness. It is likely unreasonable,
for example, to apply wholesale the federal recusal statute’s
reasonable appearance standard to agencies. Unlike federal
judges, agency adjudicators by definition have a relationship
with a party (the agency) that frequently appears before
them. They also have—particularly in the context of agency
appellate bodies and agency heads—a policymaking function
that requires adjudicators to make value judgments that a
federal judge would not be asked to make. 173 Each agency
should thus evaluate its own adjudicative system and design
a system of regulation that balances the importance of
reassuring the public about the integrity of its proceedings
against the need for effective and efficient adjudication.
Toward that end, there are some variables that may be
useful guideposts for agencies in designing recusal standards
aimed at preserving their appearance of impartiality. First
is the degree of adjudicator independence. ALJs are often
more insulated from agency influence than other
adjudicators; 174 does the presence of a non-ALJ create a
stronger appearance of partiality or bias? If so, recusal
standards for non-ALJs may need to be more stringent than
173. See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, The Administrative Law Judge as a Bridge
Between Law and Culture, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 13 (“Despite
intermittent expressions of caution—even of doubt and denial—we still turn to
ALJs to identify and articulate the nuances of agency policy.”).
174. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative
Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1345 (1992) (noting that non-ALJs “do similar
work [to ALJs] but . . . are neither comparably protected in their independence
nor compensated at similar levels”).
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for similarly situated ALJs. Imagine a recusal requirement
based on an adjudicator’s prior involvement in, or familiarity
with, a case while working within the agency in another
capacity. 175 The more insulated an adjudicator is from
agency influence, the less important it may be (or appear to
be) to remove them from cases they have previously
encountered. 176
This of course begs the question of how independence is
measured. Issues like adjudicator appointment, removal,
compensation, discipline, and assignment may all impact an
adjudicator’s freedom from agency control. Finally, agency
structure is relevant. The potential for the appearance of
impartiality is necessarily less in cases where an agency
adjudicator’s decision is subject to highly deferential review
than when it is conducted by an entirely separate agency,
such as in the relationship between the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration and the Occupational Safety and
Health Review Commission. 177
175. This is distinct from the APA’s limitation on ALJs presiding over cases in
which a prior combination of functions has inspired in them a preexisting “will to
win” on behalf of the agency. See Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“Congress intended to preclude from decisionmaking in a particular
case . . . all persons who . . . had developed, by prior involvement with the case, a
‘will to win.’”).
176. Of course, the opposite may also be true; if an adjudicator is insulated
from agency influence, they may be more willing and able to bring forward their
pre-established bias regarding the case. Assuming the prior involvement came
through working within the agency in another (non-adjudicative capacity), it is
likely that whatever personal commitment to the outcome the adjudicator
developed will persist regardless of agency influence. A lack of adjudicator
independence is thus compounded—and in turn more detrimental to the overall
impartiality of the proceeding—if the agency retains influence over the
adjudicator. The APA addresses this concern, at least in part, through its
prohibition on combination of functions. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (“The employee
who presides at the reception of evidence . . . may not . . . be responsible to or
subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the
performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency.”).
177. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) was created
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and is part of the Department
of Labor. OSHA’s mission is to set and enforce protective workplace safety and
health standards. About OSHA, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
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A second factor in determining whether and how to
develop appearance-based recusal standards is the
regularity with which the agency appears as a party before
the adjudicator. This of course is most likely where an agency
has
enforcement
responsibilities.
In
enforcement
proceedings, the fact that the agency is bringing its authority
to bear against a private party arguably magnifies the
importance of the adjudicator not only being impartial, but
also appearing so. Benefits determinations in which the
agency is a party (like those conducted by SSA) may present
less of an appearance problem for the agency because they
are not punitive, yet they are still vulnerable to charges of
discriminatory or unfair treatment of vulnerable individuals,
and thus depend on an appearance of impartiality to
preserve their legitimacy. That said, a reasonable
appearance standard cannot require recusal simply due to
the agency appearing as a party in the adjudication.
Agencies who regularly appear in evidentiary hearings
before their own adjudicators must balance that fact against
their interest in promoting a reasonable appearance of
impartiality.
Third, the proportion of an agency’s adjudicative staff to
its caseload can also inform the appropriate recusal
standard. Agencies with large adjudicative staffs and
manageable caseloads may find it easier to impose stricter
recusal standards—like a version of the reasonable
appearance standard—due to the relative ease of replacing a
recused adjudicator. Smaller agencies, or those with fewer
adjudicators, run the risk of strict recusal standards
hindering the agency’s ability to issue decisions due to a lack
of available adjudicators in a given case. Concerns about
adjudicator availability can be solved in other ways—by
encouraging alternative dispute resolution or allowing
adjudicators from other offices or agencies to sit by

ADMIN., https://www.osha.gov/aboutosha (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
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designation 178—but that does not change the fact that
recusal policies necessarily have consequences for
adjudicator availability. Any decision to adopt a reasonable
appearance standard must be cognizant of how an increased
recusal rate could affect the agency’s ability to fulfill its
adjudicatory mission.
A fourth factor is the agency’s public profile. Agencies
that administer controversial or widely popular programs
may face greater public scrutiny over their activities and, in
turn, find greater cause for appearance-based recusal than
less visible agencies. Compare, for example, an individual
benefits determination with an SEC enforcement action
against an international bank. There is no question that both
adjudications deserve and require impartial adjudicators, so
the need for actual bias protections are the same in both
cases. 179 When it comes to the appearance of impartiality,
however, it may be that the magnitude of public awareness
is directly proportionate to the increase in public confidence
created by the appearance of impartiality. If that is true,
then agencies that are more frequently in the public eye or
the subject of press or other public scrutiny may benefit more
from an appearance-based recusal standard.
Whereas recusal of a single adjudicator presents
problems if replacements are not readily available, recusal of
one of several members of an adjudicative body raises alarms
178. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 930.208 (2021) (outlining OMB’s Administrative Law
Judge Loan Program, under which OPM “coordinates the loan/detail of an
administrative law judge from one agency to another”).
179. It is important to reiterate that this factor does not address actual bias or
partiality. Actual bias or partiality are unacceptable regardless of whether they
are evident to a reasonable, outside observer. An adjudicator who is biased
against a particular religious group, for instance, may not reveal that bias
publicly and thus could be recused for actual bias, but not the appearance thereof.
The opposite is also true, say for a member of a segregated club who is not
personally biased; they could be recused for the appearance of racial bias, but not
for actual bias. When considering recusal based on an appearance of partiality,
the degree of public interest in the agency’s activity—whether anyone is
watching—could be relevant, whereas it cannot (and should not) be part of
recusal based on actual bias.
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about the resulting makeup of that body. Concerns about the
body’s ability to achieve a quorum, the administrative
complications of tied votes, and preserving the deliberative
nature of multi-member bodies may thus counsel in favor of
more flexible recusal standards. 180 Agencies should be aware
of that potential consequence when setting appearancebased recusal standards.
Appellate proceedings may raise different public
perception concerns for several reasons. First, they are likely
to be of greater public interest as the proceeding rises
through the agency decision-making hierarchy. Second, and
by contrast, an appellate tribunal may be limited in terms of
its standard of review or the factual record presented to it,
such that public expectations are (or should be) different
than they would be of an initial decision maker. Finally,
where the appellate reviewer is also the agency head,
appearances may be of greater concern due to the heightened
scrutiny and responsibility of agency leaders. These varied
and potentially conflicting considerations do not outline a
clear path for agency recusal rules generally, but they should
be taken into account by each individual agency seeking to
adopt its own recusal standards in order to balance the need
for effective and efficient adjudication against concerns
about the integrity of its adjudications.
180. At least two of these issues are readily apparent in modern administrative
law. In terms of problems achieving quorum, ongoing vacancies on the Merit
Systems Protection Board have rendered it entirely unoccupied since 2019 and
unable to perform its statutory duties since 2017. See Juliegrace Brufke,
Administration Pushes for Senate to Move on MSPB Chair Nomination, THE HILL
(July 2, 2020, 5:42 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/505719administrations-mspb-chair-pick-calls-for-senate-to-move-on-his. Tie votes have
long been a problem for multi-member agencies with an even number of leaders,
such as the Federal Election Commission. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, Beyond
Repair: FEC Reform and Deadlock Deference, in DEMOCRACY BY THE PEOPLE:
REFORMING CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN AMERICA (Eugene D. Mazo & Timothy K.
Kuhner eds., 2018) (noting the problem of deadlock at the agency and proposing
a new approach to judicial review of those deadlocks). If not monitored, recusal
could create similar problems in individual cases by altering the agency’s makeup
in an individual proceeding in a way that threatens the agency’s ability to
perform its duties.
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IV. RECUSAL PROCEDURES
Agency-specific recusal statutes should also contain
procedural requirements that meet the agency’s particular
needs and advance its goals of preventing bias and promoting
public confidence in its adjudications.
As mentioned above, agency-specific recusal regulations
should be published in the Code of Federal Regulations and
the Federal Register. This will increase public awareness of
the prevailing standards and, with regard to public
perception, help develop public confidence in an agency’s
integrity before the public has any reason to question it.
Agency recusal standards should include a right for
parties to the adjudication to petition for recusal. As
explained in the Asimow Study, peremptory challenges to
adjudicators (requiring recusal without any substantive
demonstration of bias or some other disqualifying feature)
“could be difficult and costly for agencies to implement” and
therefore should not be part of adjudicatory best practices. 181
A party’s petition for recusal is different from a
peremptory challenge in that it would still require a showing
that the adjudicator had met the regulatory standard for
recusal. It is also different from current procedures under
federal ethics regulations, because it does not require a thirdparty ethics official to initiate the recusal proceeding. A
petition process under a recusal regulation would not
preclude the agency from pursuing an ethics complaint (and
thus maintaining control over the conduct of its employees)
but would allow a party who is concerned about the
adjudicator’s fitness to file a petition to recuse the
adjudicator in the proceeding. Since the parties and the
adjudicator are most likely to be familiar with the details of
their own adjudications, allowing a right to petition for
recusal streamlines the process and puts parties in more
immediate control of their fate in instances where they are
181. ASIMOW, supra note 17, at 23.
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concerned about the integrity of the proceeding.
Recusal petitions (unlike ethics complaints) should be
heard in the first instance by the adjudicator who is being
asked to recuse. This would bring administrative recusal
procedurally in line with judicial recusal, which requires
presiding judges to initially decide their own recusal
issues. 182 The benefit of such an approach is that the judge
or adjudicator in question is very often in the best position to
know the facts of the situation and to remedy them by
removing herself from the case. Having adjudicators decide
their own recusal petitions also creates a sense of checks and
balances between parties and the bench—it discourages
parties from filing frivolous or strategic recusal motions and
pressures adjudicators to demonstrate their own
commitment to the integrity of the proceedings by resolving
the issue thoroughly and impartially.
Recusal decisions should be subject to appeal within the
agency and then to judicial review. Parties should have a
right to appeal an initial decision not to recuse. The
possibility of appeal generally will require the adjudicator
facing recusal to build a record in support of his or her
decision. The presence of a record promotes transparency
and accountability and provides a check against self-serving
recusal decisions by the presiding adjudicator. Appeal within
the agency is faster and more efficient than judicial review,
and it can be more searching as well, if agencies chose to
permit the same de novo review of factual and legal
conclusions in recusal decisions as the APA does for an ALJ’s
initial decision. 183
Agencies must determine if there should be an
intermediate appellate forum for recusal decisions or if they

182. See supra Section II.B (discussing the development of the federal judicial
recusal statute).
183. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial
decision . . . .”).
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should be appealed directly to agency heads. Due to the
potentially large number of recusal issues in some agencies,
requiring agency heads to review each recusal issue arising
anywhere within the agency’s adjudicative system would be
too burdensome. Appeal to an intermediate body is
preferable, with a possibility of discretionary review of the
intermediate appellate body by agency heads. If the initial
adjudicator’s decisions are only reviewable by the head of an
agency, an intermediate review body could be formed from
among the adjudicator’s peers for recusal issues (a panel of
fellow ALJs for an ALJ recusal issue, for example). For
recusal issues arising for one member of a multi-member
adjudicative body, initial review of the adjudicator’s decision
should be performed by the remaining members of the body,
especially if the multi-member body either is the agency
itself or is directly responsible to the agency head.
Adjudicators should provide, and agencies should
publish, written explanations of adjudicators’ recusal
decisions. Similarly, appellate reviewers of adjudicators’
recusal decisions should provide, and agencies should
publish, written explanations of the appellate reviewers’
decisions. Agencies should also seek to include the agency
official responsible for assigning adjudicators in any
intermediate appellate review of recusal matters. This would
allow agencies to retain the right to assign adjudicators to
individual cases and would ensure that the reviewing
authority would understand the institutional consequences
of recusal and reassignment in a given proceeding.
Agencies will be faced with a determination as to
whether recusal issues will be appealable on an interlocutory
basis. The issues raised in the recusal context are the same
for any interlocutory review issue—the cost of delaying the
adjudication on the merits in order to resolve a recusal
question versus the benefit of avoiding redundant
proceedings where recusal is found to be necessary after the
initial adjudication is completed. Agencies with large
adjudicatory dockets may be less inclined to permit
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interlocutory review for fear of overwhelming appellate
reviewers and delaying large numbers of active
adjudications. Agencies with smaller dockets will likely have
fewer recusal issues to review, and therefore whether they
are available on an interlocutory basis may have less of an
overall impact on agency effectiveness.
Judicial review is important as a check against the
appearance of self-serving behavior on the part of the agency.
For reasons of efficiency and expertise, some measure of
judicial deference to agency decisions would be advisable. If
agencies promulgate specific recusal regulations, then
absent an explicit prescription in the regulation itself
requiring a different standard of review, judges would likely
be required to defer to agency adjudicators’ recusal
decisions. 184 If agencies provide for internal agency appeals
of recusal decisions, then judicial deference to those
appellate decisions promotes a proper balance of efficiency
and respect for agency expertise with judges’ power to correct
184. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019) (elaborating on the
Court’s existing deference doctrine for agency interpretations of their own
regulations articulated in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1992)). The Court
in Kisor expanded the longstanding Auer deference doctrine to include a series of
considerations for courts to undertake before deciding whether to defer to an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation. In order to merit judicial deference,
the regulation must be genuinely ambiguous when subjected to the “traditional
tools” of construction, and the agency interpretation must be reasonable.
Reasonableness, according to the Court, depends on factors such as whether the
agency’s reading of the rule represents an agency’s “authoritative” or “official,”
rather than merely ad hoc, position on the matter. A reasonable interpretation
must also reflect the agency’s expertise and its fair and considered judgment,
meaning it cannot be part of a “‘convenient litigating position’ or ‘post hoc
rationalizatio[n] advanced’ to ‘defend past agency action against attack.’” Id. at
2417 (quoting Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155
(2012)). In the recusal context, a generally applicable regulation adopted either
through the APA’s notice-and-comment procedures or its exception for procedural
rules, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), will almost certainly constitute an authoritative
statement by the agency that is dependent on its own expertise regarding
administrative adjudication and reflects its fair and considered judgment. While
ambiguity will depend on the specific language of the rule and the facts
surrounding each recusal issue, questions about the appearance of impartiality
will likely be ambiguous enough to invite judicial deference in many—if not
most—cases.
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errors. If agencies do not provide for internal appeal of an
adjudicator’s recusal determination—or the recusal decision
was made by an agency head and thus not subject to review
within the agency—then agencies should consider
permitting reviewing judges to consider those decisions de
novo.
CONCLUSION
Recusal of agency adjudicators that preside over legally
required evidentiary hearings serves two important
purposes: it protects litigants from biased decisionmakers;
and it promotes public confidence in the administrative
process by demonstrating to outside observers that the
agency values impartiality.
The current legal framework around recusal of agency
adjudicators is a collection of sources—only some of which
are legally binding—that either do not fully address both of
recusal’s goals or do so only for a subset of agency
adjudicators. Agencies should fill the gap in the existing
framework by promulgating agency-specific recusal
regulations. Those regulations should be tailored to best
accommodate the specific features of the agency’s
adjudicative proceedings and its institutional needs,
particularly as they pertain to both promoting the actual and
perceived integrity of agency adjudications and maximizing
the effectiveness and efficiency of those proceedings.

